

reports received by an Information Rooms would be automatically forwarded to the relevant smaller control room. Those smaller control rooms had responsibility for actions such as directing pandas.

5. As I mention above, at the time of the pub bombings I was an Inspector in the Bourneville Information Room. I had no specific role other than to supervise all of the other staff who worked there. I had no connection with Lloyd House at that time. I recall that my ~~Chief Inspector~~ at Bourneville Information Room was named Coates. He is now deceased. I recall that a man named ~~ES~~ William Phillips also worked with me in the Information Room. There was not anyone in the Information Room with the surname of Field, or anything that sounded like Field. The surname most resembling Field would have been my surname of Fleet.

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6. Bourneville Information Room had 26 consoles. The Chief Inspector, Inspector and Sergeant based there each had a designated console. The remaining 23 consoles were divided amongst the police and civilian staff working that particular shift. The consoles each had about 80 buttons that could light up. When there was an incoming call, it would light up one of those buttons. 999 calls were given priority on the consoles. However, all calls came through in the same way. An officer would answer one of the calls by pressing one of the lit buttons. The consoles were connected to visual display units, which displayed all information that we needed when we received a call. The information we received from the call was typed into the visual display unit to form a typed action record. Once the call was made and an action was created, we would then contact an officer at the station that best ought to action it. The urgency and importance of the action determined who we would contact at the station. We spoke to someone more senior if it was important information. For example, the Chief Inspector on duty at the Information Room could have gotten in touch with the relevant Divisional Chief Superintendent at the relevant police station.

7. Anyone in the force could add to or detract from the action log created from an incoming call. The log remained for 30 days. I do not think anyone kept any handwritten logs. An audio recording was kept of each incoming call. Each morning the tapes from the day before were collected. The recordings were kept for 30 days before being wiped clean, unless it was noted in those 30 days that a call on the tape recorded something of importance. I think the tapes were very expensive.

8. I had no knowledge of coded warning calls. The Information Room was not privy to code words. No one at any point told us to be aware of coded warnings or any particular code words. If a code word had have been told to me, I would have simply told a higher authority, such as ACC Buck. I recall that at some later point, well after the pub bombings, someone said to me in passing that they had been to a police meeting at which the code word "Double-X" was mentioned. The meeting may possibly have been at Tallyho. I do not remember who said that to me.

9. So far as I am aware there were no specific policies and procedures in place to provide guidance about how to respond to a warning call. I never received any bomb warning calls. If I had have received one I would have had to use common sense, as was required for most incoming calls.

21 November 1974

10. My shift on 21 November 1974 was scheduled for 2:00pm - 10:00pm. However, I left as soon as my replacement arrived, which was well before 10:00pm. I do not know what exact time I left the Information Room but it was before the bombs in the pubs exploded. It was only the next day that I became aware of the pub bombings. I imagine that the calls made in response to the pub bombings would have gone through the Bourneville Information Room, though I am not sure.